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“A HUMAN BEING’S HIGHEST PERFECTION”:
THE GRAMMAR AND VOCABULARY OF VIRTUE IN
KIERKEGAARD’S UPBUILDING DISCOURSES
Pieter H. Vos

Focusing on the grammar and vocabulary of virtue in Kierkegaard’s
upbuilding works, it is argued that the Danish philosopher represents a
Christian conception of the moral life that is distinct from but—contrary to
Alasdair MacIntyre’s claim—not completely opposed to Aristotelian and
Thomistic virtue ethics. Although the realities of sin and salvation transcend
virtue ethics based purely on human nature, it is demonstrated that this does
not prevent Kierkegaard from speaking constructively about human nature,
its teleology (a teleological conception of the self) and about the virtues. Yet,
from a Christian “upbuilding” perspective, general features of human nature
must be transformed profoundly, which implies more than a harmonious
perfection or completion of nature (Aquinas), but less than the complete
replacement of nature by grace. Since this can be seen as a particular con
tribution to virtue ethics, in this specific sense, Kierkegaard may be called a
virtue ethicist.

Several attempts have been made to open up a dialogue between Søren
Kierkegaard and virtue ethics in general and Alasdair MacIntyre’s con
temporary account of virtue ethics in particular. Many of those who
contributed to this dialogue criticized MacIntyre’s portrayal of Kierke
gaard as an advocate of an irrational “criterionless choice”1 by outlining
Kierkegaard’s account of the nature of choice and rationality in the ethical
sphere.2 Others offered explorations of similarities and differences be
tween both thinkers on various themes, e.g., their valuation of modern
ethics, their understanding of character formation and selfhood, and the
status of moral rationality in relation to divine revelation.3
However, MacIntyre himself stays skeptical about the possibility of
connecting Kierkegaardian existential ethics and Aristotelian-Thomistic

MacIntyre, After Virtue, 39.
Davenport, “The Meaning of Kierkegaard’s Choice” and Rudd, “Reason in Ethics.”
3
Roberts, “Existence, Emotion, and Virtue”; Marino, “The Place of Reason in Kierke
gaard’s Ethics”; Lillegard, “Thinking with Kierkegaard and MacIntyre”; Mooney, “The Perils
of Polarity.”
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virtue ethics.4 In his concluding chapter to the volume Kierkegaard after
MacIntyre, he points to two important issues. First, although he admits
that his portrayal of Kierkegaard was mistaken in several respects—he
“ignored the complexity of the relationships between the choice of the
ethical, the self that makes that choice, and the self that is constituted by
that choice”5—MacIntyre seems to insist that according to Kierkegaard
the only way to make the transition from the aesthetic to the ethical (and
from the ethical to the religious) is by way of a criterionless choice.6 On
the other hand, very interestingly, MacIntyre suggests that a different
interpretation is possible as well, an interpretation in which the ethical
continuity between the aesthetic (in a negative sense) and the ethical is
acknowledged.
Hence, it is the second issue that creates the real gap between MacIntyre
and Kierkegaard, a gap stemming from large differences between any
Aristotelian-Thomistic position on the one hand and Kierkegaard’s theo
logical conceptions of revelation and faith as opposed to human reason
and nature on the other. Contrary to Kierkegaard, MacIntyre insists that,
“prior to and independently of revelation and of the gift of faith, we do
have a conception of the human good adequate to provide direction for
our actions and a knowledge of the corresponding precepts of natural law
that we can be held accountable by God.”7 Whereas in Aquinas’s view
grace presupposes and builds upon nature, in Kierkegaard’s view there
seems no relationship between the moral and intellectual virtues on the
one hand and theological virtues on the other. Moreover, Kierkegaard
presupposes a very different set of relationships between the will, reason,
and the passions from those described by either Aristotle or Aquinas.
According to MacIntyre, Kierkegaard has no place for rational choice (pro
hairesis or electio) as condition of how the virtues determine the character
of our actions. His ethics is focused on “the categorical imperative of the
will.”8 In conclusion, “the gap between an Aristotelian or Thomist ethics
of the virtues and a Kierkegaardian ethics is just too great.”9
However, in this essay I will argue that Kierkegaard is to be located
in a Christian moral tradition—in line with Augustine and the Reforma
tion—that is distinct from but not completely opposed to Aristotelianism
and Thomism. As some other Kierkegaard scholars have pointed out,
Kierkegaard sees an essential divide between antiquity, including classical
virtue ethics, and Christianity, a tension MacIntyre seems to under
rate. Kierkegaard’s Christian religiousness depends on a Augustinian

MacIntyre, “Once More on Kierkegaard,” 339–355.
MacIntyre, “Once More on Kierkegaard,” 340.
6
MacIntyre, “Once More on Kierkegaard,” 341.
7
MacIntyre, “Once More on Kierkegaard,” 351.
8
MacIntyre, “Once More on Kierkegaard,” 355.
9
MacIntyre, “Once More on Kierkegaard,” 353.
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recognition of the rift between Greek philosophy and Christianity.10 Al
though in Kierkegaard’s thought the realities of the Christian drama of
sin and salvation decisively criticize and transcend an Aristotelian moral
theory based on “human nature,” this criticism does not prevent him from
speaking in a positive way about human nature, its teleology, and the
virtues. Yet, from a Christian perspective such general features of human
nature must be transformed profoundly, i.e., a qualitative transformation
of character is needed, as I will demonstrate in an analysis of some of
Kierkegaard’s upbuilding discourses. In this respect, Kierkegaard also
disagrees with a Thomistic model of grace completing or perfecting na
ture, as adopted by MacIntyre.
Therefore, the question is if and in what respect Kierkegaard can be
regarded as a “virtue ethicist.”11 The answer to this question depends
on what we consider a proper definition of “virtue ethics.” As Christine
Swanton has demonstrated, definitions that identify virtue ethics with
just one tradition, for instance Aristotelian eudaimonism or Thomism, or
a single exemplar, for instance Aristotle or Aquinas, do not suffice, since
they would exclude other traditions and figures that have a claim to be
understood in virtue-ethical terms.12 Therefore, even if Kierkegaard ap
pears not to be very Aristotelian or Thomistic, it is still an open question
whether Kierkegaard can be considered a virtue ethicist, and if so, what
kind of virtue ethicist he may be, or to put it a little differently: what
specific contribution he could offer to virtue ethics.
Focusing on the grammar and vocabulary of virtue in Kierkegaard’s up
building works, I will argue that Kierkegaard can be understood as virtue
ethicist in the sense that he clearly uses the language of virtue, the virtues
and character formation, but that he can not be identified as Aristotelian
or Thomist. Precisely by emphasizing the need of radical transformation
of human nature before God, Kierkegaard offers a specific contribu
tion to virtue ethics that reaches beyond Aristotelianism and Thomism.
First of all, I will shortly address MacIntyre’s criticism of the ethical as
a “criterionless choice” by arguing that Kierkegaard’s understanding of
the self is teleological and that the aesthetic and the ethical as well as the
transition from the former to the latter should be understood within a
teleologically-structured anthropological framework that underlies all
of Kierkegaard’s writings. Next, I will investigate how Kierkegaard ex
plicitly refers to Aristotelian (and Thomistic) virtue-ethical concepts, and
10
Johnson, “Neither Aristotle nor Nietzsche,” points out that Kierkegaard’s Religiousness
B is beyond MacIntyre’s famous “Aristotle or Nietzsche.” Carr, “After Paganism,” argues that
Kierkegaard does not present an emotivism avant la lettre, but rather joins a long line of Chris
tian theology that is suspicious of natural theology because this tradition shows a tendency
to dilute or remove the absoluteness of revelation. Kierkegaard joins those theologians in the
Christian tradition that oppose Platonic and Aristotelian rationalism.
11
Roberts, “Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, and a Method of ‘Virtue Ethics,’” 48: “I am ar
guing . . . that Kierkegaard is pre-eminently a ‘virtue ethicist.’”
12
Swanton, “The Definition of Virtue Ethics,” 316–319.
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argue that Kierkegaard both values important classical virtue-ethical ele
ments and emphasizes the need for radical transformation. I will proceed
by explaining the nature of this need in an analysis of how the language
of perfection and perfectability is completely inverted from independency
to dependency on God, and from striving for excellence to “becoming
nothing.” Finally, it will be demonstrated that a grammar of virtue is
present in the upbuilding discourses, and that therefore, Kierkegaard’s
transformative account of virtue and the virtues should indeed be con
ceived as a contribution to virtue ethics. In this specific sense, Kierkegaard
may be called a virtue ethicist.
“A Human Being’s Highest Perfection”: A Teleological Conception of the Self
Let us start with a brief examination of MacIntyre’s criticism of what he
calls “criterionless choice.” In his contribution to the volume Kierkegaard
after MacIntyre, MacIntyre first argues that Either/Or denies the possibility
of mediation between the aesthetic and the ethical, which implies an ex
clusion of thought and reason and a fortiori of philosophy. There may be
good ethical reasons to make the transition, but from the aesthetic point
of view one has attitudes and beliefs that seem to disable the aesthete
from evaluating and appreciating those views. One has to have already
chosen oneself as an ethical subject in order to be able to appreciate those
reasons. It can only retrospectively be understood as rationally justifiable,
not prospectively.13
At the same time MacIntyre seems to agree with Peter J. Mehl, John
J. Davenport and Anthony Rudd14 that Kierkegaard’s anthropology en
tails a central teleological view of human nature and “that it does indeed
follow from that view that there are good reasons for individuals to move
from the aesthetic to the ethical and not merely good-reasons-from the
standpoint-of-the-ethical.”15 Moreover, Norman Lillegard’s contribution
to the volume helps MacIntyre to discover a different possible interpreta
tion of the nature of the aesthetic: suppose that the aesthetic personality
can be viewed as one that is engaged in unacknowledged resistance to the
ethical, “so that the aesthetic life requires a silent, but determined refusal
of the ethical” and as such is already engaged with the ethical.16 Whereas
the dominant interpretation emphasizes the discontinuity between the
aesthetic and the ethical, this strand of interpretation points to the conti
nuities in the subtext.
In my view, MacIntyre’s intuition is right, but he is not able to conceptu
alize it properly because he limits himself to analyses of what Kierkegaard
later calls “the aesthetic authorship” and doesn’t take into account that
MacIntyre, “Once More on Kierkegaard,” 344.
Mehl, “Kierkegaard and the Relativist Challenge to Practical Philosophy,” Davenport,
“The Meaning of Kierkegaard’s Choice,” and Rudd, “Reason in Ethics,” respectively.
15
MacIntyre, “Once More on Kierkegaard,” 344.
16
MacIntyre, “Once More on Kierkegaard,” 348.
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an anthropological framework in which human nature is directed to
wards an ethical-religious telos underlies all Kierkegaard’s works. In fact,
this framework centers on what MacIntyre calls a conception of humannature-as-it-could-be-if-it-realized-its-telos.17 The teleologically-structured
anthropological view is not just a perspective within the ethical sphere,
as presented in Either/Or II, but is part of Kierkegaard’s anthropological
framework that underlies all his elaborations of existential spheres and
the figures that represent these spheres in the pseudonymous works, and
culminates in the formula of the self in The Sickness unto Death and the
way this formula functions in the topology of the various manifestations
of despair. Thus, the various existential spheres and their individual ex
pressions in actuality are to be distinguished from this anthropological
framework as human potentiality. Mehl makes a similar claim by pointing
to the distinction between “ethical reality” as the general potential of be
coming and being a person on the one hand, and the “subjectively actual”
that refers to the actual or existential maintaining of this ethical reality
by an individual in his concrete existence, on the other.18 The former
designates a potential that every individual possesses as a human being.
It may be characterized as a “natural predisposition,” in a sense akin to
a (neo)Aristotelian conception of human nature. Whereas the ethical in
the latter sense may be conceived of as a stage or life-sphere, the ethical
in the former sense is not a stage but qualifies human nature/the self as
such. MacIntyre’s interpretation ignores that this distinction is explicit in
Kierkegaard’s works, resulting in contradictory evaluations of the rela
tionship between the aesthetic and the ethical.
A concept of the human being as a potentiality for development into a
deeper self runs through Kierkegaard’s oeuvre from Either/Or to The Sick
ness unto Death,19 and underlies the upbuilding works as well. In Either/Or
this potentiality is described in terms of choice: the self chooses himself, not
in his initial state of immediacy but in his “eternal validity.”20 In the 1844
MacIntyre, After Virtue, 40–41.
Mehl, “Kierkegaard and the Relativist Challenge to Practical Philosophy,” 14. I take this
as a more appropriate distinction than Davenport’s between (1) the cognitive awareness of
the objective authority of moral principles, a condition shared by both the aesthete and the
ethicist, and (2) volitional identification which gives one’s actions personal significance, a
condition only satisfied by the ethicist (Davenport, “The Meaning of Kierkegaard’s Choice,”
82–83). Either/Or II is not so much about “the objective authority of moral principles” as
about “ethical subjectivity” as a precondition for ethics.
19
Evans speaks of “a teleological view of human nature” (Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love, 21)
that is “fleshed out in a proper Aristotelian way with reference to capacities that are both
universally human and distinctive in the way that humans exemplify them” (Kierkegaard’s
Ethic of Love, 19). Whereas other works, like Fear and Trembling, are more akin to a divine
command ethics, the Aristotelian view is present in the core idea of becoming oneself, for
instance in Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript, where Johannes Climacus says
that it is “every individual’s task to become a whole person” (346 / SKS 7, 316). [SKS refers to
Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter.]
20
Kierkegaard, Either/Or II, 211 / SKS 3, 203. On the one hand, the idea of the absolute
makes the self qualitatively different from how he existed before. On the other hand,
choosing himself in his eternal validity does not mean that the self becomes someone other
17
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upbuilding discourse “To Need God is a Human Being’s Highest Perfec
tion” a similar distinction is made, but in a somewhat different setting. The
discourse speaks of a “first self” that must develop into a “deeper self.”
The relation between these two “selves” is portrayed as an inner struggle,
a dialogue. Kierkegaard emphasizes the dynamics and development of the
process of becoming oneself. In this upbuilding discourse he even uses
the language of sickness and becoming healthy that is so characteristic of
his later work: the deeper self is like a physician at the bedside of the sick,
knowing that “this sickness is not unto death but unto life.”21 Whereas the
first self is turned outward in seeking after the surrounding world as object
of identification, the deeper self is aimed at turning the first self away from
immediacy and externality to true self-knowledge.22 This does not mean
that the conditions of the first self are completely worthless. In the end,
when the first self submits to the deeper self, they are “reconciled.”
Since becoming a free responsible person is a potentiality that belongs to
each individual’s natural capacity, knowledge of the human telos is a matter
of each individual’s self-reflexive relationship to him- or herself. Basi
cally, the human potential of personhood that belongs to each individual’s
natural capacity is itself the normative standard by which to measure one’s
own existence. In order to acquire a true conception of oneself, one must
be like a teacher in relation to oneself as a learner, as one of the discourses
expresses it.23 In this sense, the ethical choice, as the affirmation of the task
to actualize oneself as this definite individual, is not criterionless. It is an
affirmation of oneself as a responsible human agent. The upbuilding dis
course “To Need God is a Human Being’s Highest Perfection” expresses
the central meaning of self-knowledge by emphasizing that the task is to
know oneself not in relation to something else, but in relation to oneself.24
To be sure, the discourse also directs the reader to the self “before God,”
which makes a significant difference. I will return to this after an examina
tion of Kierkegaard’s use of virtue-ethical language in general.
The Vocabulary of Character and Virtue
Although Kierkegaard’s anthropological scheme is teleologically struc
tured, the vocabulary of “self,” “existence,” “choice,” and “subjectivity,”
to which I referred in the preceding section, is apparently a modern one.
What about virtue ethical concepts like “character” and “virtue”—how
are they actually present in Kierkegaard’s works?

than he was before, but that he becomes himself, that is, that he chooses or, more correctly,
receives himself as someone who existed before as this specific being who he is and no other
(Either/Or II, 177, 215 / SKS 3, 172–173, 206–207).
21
Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 315 / SKS 5, 307.
22
Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 309 / SKS 5, 301.
23
Kierkegaard, Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions, 60 / SKS 5, 434.
24
Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 313 / SKS 5, 305.
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Kierkegaard does indeed employ the term “character.” Whereas
“subjectivity” functions in contrast with the interest of speculative phi
losophy, and “individual” is defined in contrast with a life oriented to
and by “the crowd,” and “self” designates the spiritual task of becoming
oneself as opposed to being in anxiety or despair, and all these concepts
are mainly directed towards modern phenomena, “character” refers to a
classical virtue-ethical background. In A Literary Review it is used in con
trast with the personality formation typical of the present age: “Morality
is character; character is something engraved (χαρασσω); but the sea has
no character, nor does the sand, nor abstract common sense, either, for
character is inwardness.”25 Here, Kierkegaard refers to the etymology of
the concept, which we also find in classical virtue ethical accounts. With
Robert C. Roberts, Kierkegaard’s concept of character may be described as
“sustained dispositional ethical . . . interest” or “commitment.”26
Moreover, character is a matter of formation. In The Book on Adler
Kierkegaard refers approvingly to the importance of character forma
tion: “In antiquity the importance of a person’s upbringing was valued
very highly, and it was understood as a harmonious development of that
which will carry the various gifts and talents and the disposition of the
personality ethically in the direction of character.”27 Unfortunately, this
“ethical education of character,” is replaced in modernity by an emphasis
on “instruction” and the child is supposed to be able to bring up himself,
which is “a great mistake.”28
In the upbuilding discourses the term “character” is absent, but as the
quotation from A Literary Review indicates, “inwardness,” which is fre
quently used in the discourses, functions more or less as its equivalent.
Although this term is often contrasted with the outer world, its meaning is
not limited to “a turn inward” or a “private interiority,” but means some
thing like “basic concern.” This becomes clear in the upbuilding discourse
“Strengthening in the Inner Being,” where Kierkegaard writes about a
person to whom not just a concern for things in the world awakens, but “a
concern about what meaning the world has for him and he for the world
. . . only then does the inner being announce its presence in this concern.”29
Furthermore, inwardness as long-term and intensive concern is closely
related to another concept: passion. In A Literary Review Kierkegaard
speaks of an “essential passion” (vaesentlige Lidenskab),30 which David J.
Gouwens describes as “an extensive interest that shapes a person’s life in
Kierkegaard, Two Ages, 77–78 / SKS 8, 75.
Roberts, “Existence, Emotion, and Virtue,” 180.
27
Kierkegaard, The Book on Adler, 133 / SKS 15, 286.
28
Kierkegaard, The Book on Adler, 133 / SKS 15, 286.
29
Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 86 / SKS 5, 93. I agree with Gouwens,
Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, 97, that the juxtaposition of “inner being” and “concern” is
central here.
30
Kierkegaard, Two Ages, 62 / SKS 8, 61.
25
26
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great breadth.”31 Inwardness as intensive concern finds its counterpart in
passion as extensive interest. This does not mean that every passion or
emotion is capable of integrating personality into a moral character, only
“essential passion” is. It is more than just an emotion, it is a uniting “idea”
to which a person is passionately related, for instance a passion for justice,
which encompasses a person’s entire life as characterized by “seeking
justice.”32 In short, both inwardness and essential passion are constitutive of
Kierkegaard’s concept of “character.” The idea of an essential passion and
commitment is similar to classical conceptions, probably more to Platonic
eros than to the (neo)Aristotelian idea of telos. At least, essential passion as
a “uniting idea” is more “rational” than MacIntyre presupposes in his criti
cism of Kierkegaard’s supposed voluntaristic view of morality.
The same holds for Kierkegaard’s treatment of continuity or stability
of character. In A Literary Review Kierkegaard explains that whereas a
person without character is an “unstable emptiness,” a person with char
acter has something to “dwell upon.”33 In the discourse “To Need God is
a Human Being’s Highest Perfection,” constancy is what the “deeper self”
offers amidst the changing reality and inconstancy of the “first self.”34 In
a sense, the occasional discourse on “Purity of Heart” is dedicated to an
exploration of constancy of character: purity of heart is to will one thing.
Kierkegaard argues that only “the good” is truly one. Only by taking on
the essential character of the object of his willing (the good) can the self
be pure in heart, i.e., one. On the other hand, he can be one only when he
wills the good.35 Interestingly, it is precisely this thought—purity of heart
is to will one thing—which MacIntyre approvingly quotes and explicitly
relates to the (neo)Aristotelian-Thomistic concept of “integrity” or “con
stancy,” i.e., “singleness of purpose in a whole life.”36 In doing so, he in
fact presupposes the teleological meaning of Kierkegaard’s argument in
this discourse.
Valuing and Transcending Aristotle’s Realism
All these elements reflect important features of the virtue-ethical tradi
tion, but for the most part rather implicitly. It is still a question to what
extent Kierkegaard actually derives his concepts from Aristotle and other
virtue-ethical representatives. An adequate way to answer this question
is to trace how Kierkegaard explicitly values key representatives of virtue
ethics like Aristotle and Aquinas and their virtue ethical concepts. From his
Gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, 97.
Gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, 97.
33
Kierkegaard, Two Ages, 54 / SKS 8, 54. See also Roberts, “Existence, Emotion, and Virtue,”
180.
34
Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 314 / SKS 5, 306.
35
See Connell, To Be One Thing, 160–161.
36
MacIntyre, After Virtue, 203, as well as his Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 165, and
Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry, 143.
31
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Notebooks we know that Kierkegaard read the Nicomachean Ethics, but he
did not show any serious interest in Aquinas. Since at the time Hegelians
were the only people that sympathized with Aquinas, in Kierkegaard’s
perception, Aquinas was under the verdict of being an “objective thinker.”
Moreover, as a Lutheran, Kierkegaard was theologically on a different
track, as we will see.37 Therefore, let’s turn to his reading of Aristotle.
Kierkegaard read the Nicomachean Ethics in 1842. In Notebook 13
we find a collection of interesting entries on Aristotle’s Ethics,38 which
Kierkegaard apparently read both in German and Greek, but quickly and
superficially, as Håvard Løkke argues, for “it did not make a great impres
sion on Kierkegaard.”39 Løkke analyzes that Kierkegaard’s notes, together
with other instances in his works where he refers to Aristotle’s ethics, are
concerned with two themes: first, with how an agent’s ignorance bears on
the agent’s act being voluntary or not, second, with the human being as
social, especially in terms of friendship.
If I limit myself to the first theme, Kierkegaard correctly observes that
Aristotle regards the voluntary as a wider category than προαίρεσις (pro
hairesis). However, it is striking, as Løkke demonstrates, that Kierkegaard
translates the latter by “intention” (Forsæt) instead of “choice” or “deci
sion.” Løkke concludes that Kierkegaard did not discover that choice is a
key notion in Aristotle’s ethics.40 This may be correct, but does not mean
that Kierkegaard and Aristotle do not have much in common on this con
cept (although there are differences in how each thinker relates reason,
will, and the passions).
Furthermore, in my view, Løkke’s overall evaluation of Kierkegaard’s
treatment of Aristotle is too limited. For it is noteworthy that Kierkegaard
is on Aristotle’s side against Socrates and Plato in rejecting the view that
we are entirely governed by reason. According to Kierkegaard, Aristotle
dismisses their “idealistic view . . . that all sin is ignorance.” Nevertheless,
Aristotle too “does not eliminate the difficulty, because he merely ends in
a realistic counterposition.”41 Løkke interprets this realistic position in the
sense that, according to Kierkegaard, Aristotle limits himself to concrete
cases and situations, in particular that whether something happens or not
depends on one’s choice,42 while, for Løkke, Kierkegaard fails to understand
37
See Olivares Bøgeskov, “Thomas Aquinas: Kierkegaard’s View Based on Scattered and
Uncertain Sources,” 183–206.
38
Søren Kierkegaard, Journals and Notebooks, Vol. 3, 385–386 / SKS 19, 387–389; Not13:10–21.
39
Håvard Løkke, “Nicomachean Ethics,” 47–49, quote on 49.
40
Håvard Løkke, “Nicomachean Ethics,” 53.
41
Kierkegaard, Journals and Notebooks, Vol. 3, 385–386 / SKS 19, 387–388; Not13:15.
42
Løkke, “Nicomachean Ethics,” 54, who quotes Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, 17
note / SKS 4, 225, where the pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus dwells on Greek
thought: “‘The depraved person and the virtuous person presumably do not have the power
over their moral condition, but in the beginning they have the power to become the one or
the other, just as the person who throws a stone has power over it before he throws it but
not when he has thrown it’ (Aristotle).” This quote seems to refer to Nicomachean Ethics 1114a
12–19.
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Aristotle’s point that the choice is not merely directed to concrete actions,
but to becoming a virtuous person, a good character. I think that this is a
speculative interpretation of Kierkegaard’s comments. In my interpretation,
Kierkegaard regards Aristotle’s realistic position as a better alternative to the
intellectual psychology of Socrates and Plato, because Aristotle stresses the
voluntary nature of “sin,” “such that something can be voluntary without
being intended,”43 as Kierkegaard remarks in the entry immediately pre
ceding the one on Aristotle’s counterposition to Socrates/Plato. At the same
time, this is still not a solution, because in Aristotle’s account the problem
of sin is not solved. These remarks clearly reveal Kierkegaard’s own posi
tion in regard of Aristotelian virtue ethics: Aristotle rightly holds a realistic
view of human shortcomings and sin in comparison with the ideal of moral
excellence, but cannot solve the problem of sin. Since human fallibility is a
core problem, from Kierkegaard’s approach any virtue ethics needs a theo
logical basis that marks the human being’s dependency on God and His
forgiveness, as we will see.
Meanwhile, Kierkegaard’s notes reveal that he was aware of some im
portant classical virtue-ethical presuppositions. First, he acknowledges
the importance of the Aristotelian μεσότης (mesotès) or mean in the moral
virtues, such as courage, temperance, generosity and justice, and under
lines its correctness, for desire and disinclination as the things with which
the moral virtues struggle are neither good nor evil in themselves. He
also observes that the mean is not used in Aristotle’s conception of the
intellectual virtues, and mentions these virtues: τέχνη (technè), ἐπιστήμη
(epistèmè), σωφροσύνη (soophrosunè), νοῦς (nous), σοφία (sophia), though it
is a mistake to mention σωφροσύνη here instead of the very important Ar
istotelian virtue of φρόνησις (phronèsis). Second, Kierkegaard emphasizes
that virtue is to be seen as an attitude or acquired ability (ἕξις, heksis), which
brings continuity in one’s acting. Third, notwithstanding Kierkegaard’s
wrong translation, he observes the centrality of προαίρεσις in Aristotle
and, contrary to MacIntyre’s claim that I referred to in the introduction,
the idea that our lives are morally formed by our previous deliberate
choices is present in Kierkegaard’s reading of Aristotle and arguably in
his own thought as well, as I will illustrate in my analysis of one of the
upbuilding discourses. Fourth, Kierkegaard is aware of the importance
of the distinction between ποιεῖν (poiein) and πραττεῖν (prattein) in Aris
totle, albeit that his interest is limited to how they function in poetry and
art. Fifth, Kierkegaard understands the Aristotelian concept of eudaimonia
or happiness as an activity that is desirable in itself. Finally, Kierkegaard
adopts the Aristotelian definition of motion (κίνησις, kinèsis) as a transi
tion from possibility to actuality and this is a central point of departure for
his thinking about freedom, the development of the self, and actuality.44
Kierkegaard, Journals and Notebooks, Vol. 3, 386 / SKS 19, 388; Not13:14.
Kierkegaard, Journals and Notebooks, Vol. 3, 385–386, 393 / SKS 19, 387–389, 396; Not13:
10–21, 27.
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Yet, it is questionable whether these Aristotelian concepts really had a
deep impact on Kierkegaard’s thought. Kierkegaard also offers criticism
of Aristotle, which reveals important differences between Aristotle and
his own approach. In his notes of 1842, he criticizes Aristotle for his lim
ited, aesthetic understanding of the human self as directed to happiness
in the sense of intellectual contemplation. The contemplative life is un
derstood in aesthetic terms and as isolation and not in terms of becoming
spirit: “the happiness of the divine doesn’t consist in contemplation but
in eternal communication.”45 Surely, Løkke is right that Kierkegaard
here posits something beyond Aristotle for which the latter should not
be blamed. However, when Løkke describes Kierkegaard’s criticism as
being that “Aristotle’s only fault in this regard is that he was born too
early,”46such a qualification ignores that Kierkegaard here reveals how he
envisions the relationship between Greek and Christian thought, namely
that a philosopher like Aristotle may provide us with a valuable concept
of virtue, formation and its teleological structure, but that he “lacks the
category needed to complete the movement.”47 Christian categories do not
oppose or replace ancient categories, but indeed add something crucial to
these categories, and transform them in a profound way. This is precisely
how Kierkegaard deals with classical virtue ethics: the whole perspective
changes as soon as character and virtue are conceived as before God.
In a journal entry from 1849, Kierkegaard explains the difference in ap
proach between a classical virtue-ethical approach and his own Protestant
view:
Luther says, It is not good works that make a good man, but a good man
who does good works, i.e. the man is what has become habitual, something
more than all individual actions. And, indeed, according to Luther, one be
comes a good man through faith. Thus, first comes faith. It is not through a
virtuous life, good works, and the like, that one attains faith. No, it is faith
that causes one truly to do good works.48

The main difference does not concern the formal description of virtue, for
Aristotle too emphasizes that the good man is the one who has acquired
good attitudes, which are more than individual actions. The point is that
in Luther’s Christian conception the source of the virtues differs: faith
rather than what a human being himself accomplishes. This conviction
is reflected in the famous remark in The Sickness unto Death that “the op
posite of sin is not virtue, but faith,”49 which is not intended as an entire
disqualification of virtue, but as an acknowledgement of the difference

Kierkegaard, Journals and Notebooks, Vol. 3, 387 / SKS 19, 389; Not13:20.
Løkke, “Nicomachean Ethics,” 58.
47
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in grammar and tradition between antiquity and Christianity.50 At this
point, we could say that although Kierkegaard does not explicitly refer
to Aquinas, his Lutheran conception of faith based virtue is in line with
the theological nature of a Thomistic virtue ethics. Yet, as I will show,
Kierkegaard also differs from Aquinas, especially in regard of the latter’s
harmonious view of nature and grace. Kierkegaard’s Lutheran model
does not build grace upon nature, but asks for a complete renouncement
of natural capacities in order to rest on grace.
In sum, Kierkegaard concurs in many respects with Aristotle (and
Aquinas), but, as far as I can see, none of the Aristotelian concepts
Kierkegaard mentions in his notes on the Nicomachean Ethics plays a
decisive role in his published works. There are only a few references to
these concepts, such as the notion of the mean in The Sickness unto Death,
which, however, he understands in a non-Aristotelian way as ne quid nimis,
“mediocrity,” and as such criticizes it.51 Explicit references to Aristotelian
concepts like prohairesis, eudaimonia or praxis are absent, which does not
imply that Kierkegaardian concepts like “decision” or “choice,” “eternal
happiness” and “existence” do not show commonality with these Aristo
telian concepts. In conclusion, what we find in Kierkegaard’s works are no
more and no less than classical virtue-ethical traces. However, an analysis
of how some virtues and virtue-ethical elements appear in his upbuilding
works will demonstrate that Kierkegaard’s contribution consists in what
he adds to the virtue ethical tradition.
“To Need God . . . ”: The Inverted Language of Perfection
Let us first observe the appearance of the word “virtue” in the upbuilding
discourses. It is not frequently used, but whenever Kierkegaard speaks
about virtue (Dyd) it is in a positive way. The concept of virtue is appro
priate to the purpose of upbuilding. In one of the discourses in “The Gospel
of Sufferings” Kierkegaard speaks of “the road of virtue,” which we cannot
precisely locate but consists in “how it is walked.”52 Another discourse
emphasizes: “It is true and always will be true that virtue is the highest
sagacity”53 and speaks of “the beautiful virtue of conciliatory spirit.”54 In
the discourse “Against Cowardliness” virtue is called a “sacred word.”55
Kierkegaard quotes Ludwig de Ponte saying that it is wretched “to have
an abundance of intentions and a poverty of action, to be rich in truths
and poor in virtues.”56 This utterance functions in an argument about the
See Roberts, “Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein,” 151.
Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, 86–87 / SKS 11, 200.
52
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virtue of courage, meaning to act in the face of danger instead of avoiding
action like a coward. In courageous action, the good is seen as “the goal,”
as “the truly great and noble,” though it only takes on concrete meaning as
something particular in relation to an individual’s particularity.57 Besides
these clearly virtue-ethical explications, Kierkegaard speaks of various
vices that have to be conquered in the ethical task of becoming oneself,
which includes overcoming oneself. In one’s inner being there may be “the
temptations of glory and temptations of fear and temptations of despon
dency, of pride and of defiance and of sensuality.”58 In these and several
other instances, the language of virtue appears to be appropriate for the
upbuilding task. Although virtue itself does not function as a core concept
in the discourses but rather serves the upbuilding aim, Kierkegaard’s use
of it is in line with traditional virtue ethical language.
Another virtue-ethical trace can be detected in how Kierkegaard applies
the language of perfection (or excellence) in the discourses. At the same
time, it becomes clear that unlike Plato and Aristotle, the virtues can not
be achieved autonomously by one’s own agency. Although the language
is reminiscent of virtue ethics, perfection is not a matter of perfectibility of
human nature in an Aristotelian sense, but is exclusively interpreted in the
religious context of the relationship with God. In the discourse “To Need
God is a Human Being’s Highest Perfection,” the self has to be turned away
from the external in order to understand in profound self-knowledge that
he is “not capable of anything at all.”59
Here, we find an example of what Kierkegaard calls “inverted dialectic”
or “dialectic of reversal,”60 which he employs in his upbuilding works to
set out how in a Christian sense the positive is characterized by the nega
tive and loss in the worldly sense is gain in a deeper sense, just as “the
butterfly gains by losing the caterpillar’s chrysalis.”61 Thus, perfection is
paradoxically present in the acknowledgment of one’s incapability. The
highest a person can achieve is to become fully convinced that he himself
is capable of nothing.62 The self must “become nothing before God”63 in
order to rest in God “who is capable of all things.”64 Perfection includes
the acknowledgment of one’s “real self,” and is interpreted as dependency
on God. Kierkegaard wants to make his reader aware of the gift-like char
acter of the self. In the end, it is not by one’s own power that one becomes
Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 357–358 / SKS 5, 343–344.
Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 320 / SKS 5, 311.
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oneself, since one cannot create oneself.65 In this sense, there is no true
conception of the self without a corresponding conception of God.66 The
rather extreme notion of “annihilation before God” is important in order
to emphasize the religious moment in which the self becomes aware of
the fact that he is not able to realize himself by himself. To need God is
precisely the real perfection of man.
How is this theological perspective related to the philosophical-anthro
pological “natural predisposition” we discovered previously? Interestingly,
this discourse still presupposes that a person without the knowledge of
dependency on God can still be a self with deep “roots in existence” and
profound knowledge of its capabilities and talents which he develops “as
much as possible in conformity with his given situation.”67 These natural
capabilities are acknowledged, but from a religious upbuilding perspec
tive such self-knowledge and self-realization is incomplete and may even
be a delusion, since one knows oneself in relation to “something else”
instead of knowing oneself in relation to oneself and to God. Hence, the
emphasis is put on the inverted conception of perfection as incapability
before God, who at the same time makes all things possible.68
Notwithstanding this radical transformation, the natural is thus
somehow presupposed. That the former does not exclude the latter be
comes also clear in the discourse “To Preserve One’s Soul in Patience”: “Let
us praise what is truly praiseworthy, the glory of human nature; . . . let us
pray that we might be granted the grace to perfect this glory gloriously in
a more beautiful and more unambiguous way.”69 In one of the Christian
discourses of “The Gospel of Sufferings,” Kierkegaard refers to the “moral
order of things” that is “easily grasped” and “universally accepted.”70 All
kinds of earthly ends or goods and related means belong to this order.
On the other hand, Kierkegaard speaks of the “infinitely superior” end of
“eternal happiness.”71 This good “beyond all measure”72 is decisive, which
points to a radical transformation of nature by grace, a “profound change”
of what “natural man” wishes or desires.73
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I think that “transformation” is indeed an adequate description of
how Christian conceptions of faith and grace relate to natural virtuous
ness in Kierkegaard’s thought. Transformation implies more than just the
perfection or completion of nature, but less than the complete replacement
of nature by grace. Although Kierkegaard uses the language of perfection,
he does not adopt a Thomistic model of gratia perficit naturam, since this
model would be too harmonious. Rather than by (natural) progress or a
Thomistic completion of natural capacities, in this view virtue is marked
by transformation that requires “inversion” and “conversion.” In the
end, this has to do with the radical nature of human fallibility and sin. As
Sylvia Walsh states, in Kierkegaard’s view human character is formed via
a relation to God in Christ, who not only atones for human sin but also
constitutes the qualitative criterion and ethical goal for human selfhood,
“which is always in the process of being realized due to its infinite char
acter and the continuation of sin.”74
A Grammar of Virtue
In Kierkegaard’s treatment of specific classical and Christian virtues in the
upbuilding works we detect similar patterns of both continuity and dis
continuity with classical and medieval virtue ethics. Courage, for instance,
presupposes that there is some resistance. As in the traditional descrip
tion, courage is the proper attitude for facing danger and for overcoming
anxiety; Kierkegaard uses the metaphor of a rider on a horse. The rider
is the courageous one that subdues what is base and shying in him.75 On
the other hand, courage is understood within a Christian framework of
meaning, namely as an attitude that is related to suffering rather than to
fighting. The notion that courage is marked by voluntary and avoidable
suffering reflects a Christian conceptualization of this virtue. The prime
example is not the warrior, as in the Greek conception, but the martyr who
is willing to suffer for the good.
Another important virtue in the upbuilding works is patience. Whereas
“courage goes freely into the suffering that could be avoided, . . . patience
makes itself free in the unavoidable suffering.”76 Patience perfectly illus
trates what virtue is: “a category of freedom” making literally “a virtue of
necessity,” of what is defined as necessity, namely the unavoidable.77 Again
Kierkegaard distinguishes between a natural and a Christian conception
74
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of patience. In a natural sense patience is beneficial in order to achieve
something in life—the expectation, the fulfillment is so to say bound up
with temporality. In this case, patience is directed to an external condition,
to something that is gained by virtue of patience as a means.78 Reli
giously speaking, patience is required in order to gain and preserve one’s
soul; moreover, gaining one’s soul is precisely gaining patience. Finally,
patience is defined in terms derived from the Christian tradition. Patience
is not just about giving each person and each thing the time they need or
waiting for the fulfillment of a wish, but real patience “leaves its expec
tancy up to God.”79
From this perspective it is understandable that an Aristotelian virtue
like magnanimity is not seen as a virtue, because of the assumption that
it is important that you have much to give. Rather than magnanimity, it
is the Christian virtue of mercy that comes to the fore.80 For mercifulness
consists not in what one gives but in how one gives.81 Finally, the discourses
show some traces of the trio of faith, hope and love.82 These virtues func
tion in keeping a person in the decision to be with the good; as such they
are treated by Kierkegaard, like Aquinas, as virtues of the will. On the
other hand, we nowhere find the Thomistic conception of infused virtues
as habits that enable one to acquire salvation through a supernatural
enhancement of one’s natural capabilities. It is not by infusion but by
receiving redemption and by participating in God’s renewal of the self
that we may grow in the virtues. In this way, various other virtues are
described in language that both reflects elements of a multifaceted history
of virtue ethics and emphasizes different elements.
Admittedly, Kierkegaard does not offer a coherent table of cardinal and
theological virtues and virtues that can be derived from them, as Aquinas
does. Therefore, the proper approach is to examine whether an essential
grammar of virtue is present in Kierkegaard’s treatment of those qualities
we usually call virtues. Following Roberts’s Wittgensteinian approach,
“grammar” in this case means “some kind of internal conceptual order
that the virtue possesses.”83 “Grammar” also points to the distinctiveness
of a particular language of virtue and the virtues, bringing out “those dis
tinctive concepts in terms of which an exemplifier of these virtues ‘sees the
world.’”84 Kierkegaard’s treatment of the virtues in the upbuilding works
displays at least three grammatical rules that may be regarded as constitu
tive of the grammar of virtue he uses.
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A first grammatical rule is that virtues are not simply described as
dispositions to perform actions that follow ethical rules, but rather as
encompassing attitudes of a person as moral character. In Kierkegaard’s
description of patience, for instance, a kind of circularity functions that is
akin to Aristotle—patience is developed through patient action and the
virtue of patience enables one to act patiently—which also underscores
that virtue is an encompassing attribute characterizing a person: “The
person who grows in patience does indeed grow and develop. What is
it that grows in him? It is patience. Consequently, patience grows in him,
and how does it grow? Through patience.”85
A second grammatical rule concerns the complex psychology of virtue, in
which one virtue is in one way or another related to other virtues. In order to
be courageous, one has to be prudent as well. It may also require persever
ance, hope and other virtues. This aspect is traditionally expressed in the
so-called doctrine of “the unity of the virtues.” Kierkegaard does not offer
an account of such doctrine, but in his treatment of the virtue of meekness
or “gentle courage,” for instance, he demonstrates that this virtue is at
least compounded of other virtues:
There is courage [Mod], which bravely defies dangers; there is high-mind
edness [Høimod], which proudly lifts itself above grievances; there is pa
tience [Taalmod], which patiently bears sufferings; but the gentle courage
[sagte Mod] that carries the heavy burden lightly is still the most wonderful
compound.86

In “gentle courage” or meekness the strength of courage and the endur
ance of patience are combined. Moreover, the virtues find their unity in
their directedness toward the good. The pursuit of this goal requires other
virtues, for instance love, self-control and resoluteness.87
A third element belonging to the grammar of virtue is that a broad range
of human capacities such as knowledge, emotion, will and imagination are
involved.88 In my view, this applies to Kierkegaard’s treatment of the vir
tues, although not without reserve: in the end the will seems to be decisive.
In “Purity of Heart” the relationship between feeling, knowledge, and will
becomes clear. In relation to the good, the starting point is “immediate
feeling,” which is “the vital force” in which “is life,” but this feeling “must
‘be kept’” in order not to lead to double-mindedness. It must “not be left
to its own devices, but . . . be entrusted to the power of something higher
that keeps it.”89 It needs “knowledge of the good,” which provides a clear
understanding of one’s situation. However, knowledge and understanding
Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 169 / SKS 5, 168.
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can also deteriorate into double-mindedness, as soon as they call you
away from actuality for the sake of obtaining an observer’s point of view.
Knowledge or understanding must “penetrate time,” in a “deliberation”
that will not lead to knowledge from the “distance of eternity” but to a
real understanding of oneself in actuality.90 Therefore, ultimately the will
is needed as the most decisive capacity in one’s dedication to the good. It
even seems that the will completely overrules knowledge and reason: it is
double-mindedness to think that not “the will is the mover but that it itself
is to be moved . . . and supported by reasons, considerations, the advice
of others, experiences, and rules of conduct.”91 Yet, this is only one part of
the story. As Roberts has pointed out, the upbuilding discourses repeat
edly instruct the reader how to think about a particular situation. The key
to gaining freedom from all kinds of care, for instance, is not to change
one’s physical or social circumstances, but to change one’s way of thinking
about a situation.92 It is the “power of thought” that can take away “the
thought of possession.”93 Consciousness, i.e., a particular way of thinking,
is a decisive condition in an upbuilding process in which one also comes
to know oneself.94 Thus, religious thoughts are the basis for a configura
tion of emotional responses. These patterns of response may become stable
dispositions of the personality.
As a whole, the discourses show an ambiguous evaluation of thought
and reason, including what we may call “prudence” or “practical wisdom”
in the sense of phronesis. Reason can be used both positively and nega
tively. On the one hand, (religious) thought and understanding definitely
have a positive function in how to respond to the vicissitudes of life. On
the other hand, reason can operate as Klogthed, meaning “shrewdness,”
“calculating smartness,” “sophisticated reasoning,” which makes one
avoid real dedication to the good and real resoluteness over against those
vicissitudes. One must do away with all such calculation, shrewdness and
probability, in order to will the good only “because it is the good.”95 In
this respect the Augustinian and Protestant emphasis on the will is indeed
prevalent over the acknowledgment of human rational powers. Although
Kierkegaard thus gives a particular ordering of the human capacities re
lated to the virtues, he nevertheless does employ what we have called a
“grammar of virtue.”
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Conclusion
Is Kierkegaard a virtue ethicist? The answer depends on how virtue ethics
is defined. In her concise analysis, Swanton argues that neither a concept
of virtue ethics as directed to the flourishing (eudaimonia) of the possessor
of virtue, to excellence and practical wisdom as necessary components,
nor a concept of virtue ethics that takes agent-centeredness as its core, but
a concept of virtue ethics that centers on virtue notions in general, such
as justice or kindness, should be taken to define what is to be regarded as
virtue ethics and what not.96 If we follow this argument, Kierkegaard is
to be regarded as a virtue ethicist, since he explicitly and implicitly refers
to both the vocabulary and the grammar of virtue and the virtues. How
ever, in the sense of a pre-eminent representative of the ethical theory that
most consider to be virtue ethics par excellence, i.e., Aristotelianism and
Thomism, Kierkegaard can not be regarded as a virtue ethicist without
reserve. As a whole, his explicit references to this particular tradition are
too limited and his explorations of virtue and the virtues are too different
for such a qualification.
Although Kierkegaard’s conception of the will and his overall moral
psychology differ from Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s, Kierkegaard’s depic
tions of virtue and the virtues in the upbuilding discourses demonstrate
that both a particular vocabulary of virtue and a “grammar of virtue” are
clearly present. Precisely because of his specific treatment of virtue and the
virtues, Kierkegaard offers a particular contribution to the broad tradition
of virtue ethics. In Kierkegaard’s upbuilding discourses the virtues serve
the aim of the upbuilding, i.e., to make the reader aware of him- or herself
as existing “before God.” The upbuilding can be seen as directed towards
the telos of selfhood and as such functions in a teleologically structured
anthropological view. As MacIntyre himself suggests, what separates him
from Kierkegaard is not the lack of teleology, but the different concep
tions of reason, deliberate choice and the relationship between the natural
and the theological. Whereas MacIntyre, in line with Aquinas, considers
revelation to be completely in line with ethical reason and the theological
virtues to be additional to the natural virtues, in Kierkegaard’s AugustinianProtestant view the necessity of radical transformation is pivotal, yet not in
such a way that the natural capacities of human nature are completely
ruled out. Radical transformation is needed since a human being cannot
achieve moral excellence by his own activity, as Kierkegaard already ob
served in his early remarks on Aristotle’s ethics. The importance of this
notion is that it recognizes that character formation is deeply frustrated
by moral flaws and human shortcomings. Therefore, in his moral striving
the human being continuously depends on God’s grace as the true source
of his perfection.
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